We investigate whether rising oil prices have resulted in over-rating of oil-producing countries by rating agencies, after controlling for fundamentals. Based on a large dataset of countries from Standard and Poor's and Moody's, we find strong statistical evidence of a large ratings premium-nearly two notches-for those oilproducing countries with a large share of net oil revenue to gross domestic product, relative to countries with similar economic fundamentals. We have some limited forecast information from the rating agencies and the effect increases when we include this information, providing further evidence that this ratings premium is not driven by expected improvements in fundamentals. This finding has significant implications for asset prices in oil-producing countries and highlights the risk that in the event of a sharp unanticipated drop in oil prices, sovereign rating downgrades of oil-producing countries could be sharper than the deterioration in their economic fundamentals.
Introduction
Sovereign credit ratings reflect rating agencies' opinions on the future ability and willingness of government to repay principal and interest on public debt on time. A sovereign rating may be viewed as a forward-looking estimate of the country's default probability by the rating agency. Sovereign rating is critical to the financial and economic stability of a country and is important for the following four reasons. Firstly, sovereign rating is a key determinate of the interest rate a country faces in the international financial market, which in turn is a critical factor in determining asset prices in the sovereign. Secondly, sovereign rating usually acts as a cap on the credit ratings of domestic companies. Thirdly, some institutional investors have mandates to invest only in investment grade bonds. This means that a lower rating will unfavorably restrict the type of investments that a country can attract. Finally, Basel II 1 uses sovereign rating as a tool for determining overall risk of banks.
Oil prices have surged from US$26 in late 2001 to over US$100 in early 2008, a rise of almost 300 per cent. This resulted in a sharp improvement in the economic fundamentals of oil-producing countries and steady sovereign upgrades by Standard and Poor's (S&P) and Moody's Investment Service (Moody's). But has sovereign rating run ahead of the improvement in economic fundamentals? This is a very important question given the tight linkage between ratings and both corporate and sovereign bond prices and has significant implications on the asset prices in oil-producing countries.
The literature is rich in studies on the determinants of sovereign ratings. However, to the best of our knowledge, there have been no attempts to investigate whether rising oil prices have had an impact on S&P and Moody's ratings of oil-producing countries, after controlling for improvements in fundamentals. This paper finds that there is evidence to suggest that, during the latter part of our sample period when oil prices were high, sovereign ratings of countries for whom net oil revenue accounted for more than 20 per cent of gross domestic product were significantly higher even after incorporating improving fundamentals. Our findings are robust to various combinations of explanatory variables and choice of econometric technique. High oil-producing countries (where net oil revenue accounted for more than 20 per cent of gross domestic product) on average are rated up to 2 notches higher in 2006 and 2007 vis-à-vis countries with similar fundamentals. This ratings premium appears to be a recent phenomenon which becomes large and significant around 2003 in the Standard and Poor's sample and around 2005 in the Moody's sample. This paper makes three important contributions to the existing literature. Firstly, this is the first paper to examine whether rising oil prices have resulted in a ratings premium for oil-producing countries, after controlling for improvements in economic fundamentals. Secondly, this is the first paper to incorporate, albeit in a limited way, forecasts of sovereign ratings agencies into econometric models. This is important because rating agencies have stated explicitly that they examine both historical economic trends and forecasts when assigning sovereign ratings. Thirdly, to the best of our knowledge, this paper has the largest ever dataset in any research on sovereign ratings. Our dataset incorporates 115 countries representing 92 per cent of sovereign covered by S&P and 96 per cent of sovereigns covered by Moody's. This paper concludes that persistently high oil prices over the last 5 years have been accompanied by a positive rating bias towards high oil-producing countries on the part of rating agencies. An obvious and important risk to highlight is that in the event of a sharp drop in oil prices, downgrades of high oil-producing countries could be sharper than the deterioration in economic fundamentals. This is particularly important given the well-documented volatility and unpredictability of resource prices.
The organization of the paper is as follows. Section 2 provides a brief review of the rating system and rating agencies, the literature on sovereign ratings determinants, and a description of our data. In section 3 we discuss the econometric models. Section 4 presents the results. We also in that section discuss the interpretation of our results for oil-producing countries in detail, examine the inclusion of forecast information, and test the robustness of our model. We conclude in section 5.
Ratings systems and our data
While there are a large number of credit rating agencies, S&P and Moody's are generally considered to be the two dominant players in the credit rating market. S&P and Moody's use different qualitative codes for their ratings but there is a close correspondence between the two. S&P uses twenty-two categories from AAA (highest) to D (lowest). Moody's uses twenty-one categories from Aaa (highest) to C (lowest). For our analysis, we combine the lowest six categories of S&P (CCC+ to D) and the lowest five of Moody's (Caa1 to C) as there are very few countries in these categories. Table   1 shows the ratings scale for the two agencies and the number of sample observations in each category at July, 2007. Several papers have considered the determinants of sovereign ratings. An early paper on the determinants of credit ratings is Cantor and Packer (1996) . A recent comprehensive paper on the determinants of credit ratings is Afonso et al. (2006b) . Borio and Packer (2004) apply OLS regression to a linear representation of ratings to examine the determinants of ratings. Rowland and Torres (2005) discuss the relationship between sovereign credit spread and credit ratings using a panel data approach. Bhatia (2002) provides an extenisve review of the rating methodologies of the agencies. Afonso et al. (2006a) and Bissoondoyal-Bheenick et al. (2005) discuss different econometric methodologies to study the determinants of sovereign ratings. In general, these papers conclude that ratings can be explained by a small set of quantitative explanatory variables including per-capita Gross Domestic Product (GDP), GDP growth, fiscal balance, inflation, public debt, external debt, current account receipts, foreign exchange reserves, investment, unemployment and trade and investment as percentages of GDP. In addition, qualitative variables such as the level of economic/technological development, quality of government, geographical location of sovereigns and default history are also found to be significant in explaining ratings.
Studies released by S&P and Moody's generally concur with the academic literature on the relevant set of explanatory variables.
We constructed a panel data set of 115 countries from 1998 to 2007. Fiscal and external debt for twelve countries was obtained from official government web sites. 7 One might question whether this data has been subject to the same quality assurance as that available from international agencies, but we would note that if we drop these countries from our analysis it does not affect our results.
Oil and gas production and consumption was collated from publicly available data, BP (2007) . There were 39 net oil producing countries in the world in 2006, of which 25 countries were rated by S&P and/or Moody's. To distinguish countries in which oil revenue is only a small part of total revenue from those where it is the dominant part of total revenue, we define a 'high' oil-producing country as one where more than 20 per cent of GDP comes from oil and gas production. A 'low' oil-producing country is one with positive net oil and gas production which accounts for less than 20 per cent of GDP. See Table 3 Standard & Poor's (2006) provide detail about the approach of the agencies in determining ratings. The rating agencies state that external debt is not a significant risk for developed countries as strong financial systems allow government and corporate entities to borrow long term in domestic currency. Therefore, for advanced countries, external debt is set to zero.
Once we take these three year averages, we start analysis in 1999 as the first two years are missing for the three-year averages. We were unable to obtain reliable unemployment data for most of the developing countries so we do not include this variable. Nor do we include level of technological progress as we could find no data on this. We include regulatory quality, which we have not seen used in other studies.
We estimate our models with the full set of explanatory variables which have been identified as being important determinants of sovereign ratings.
Model and econometric specifications
The dependent variable in our model is the foreign currency government bond ratings of S&P and Moody's. Note that rating agencies also assign a variety of other types of foreign currency ratings to a sovereign, including country ceiling and bank deposits.
However, sovereign rating is synonymous with foreign currency government bond ratings and this is the rating which attracts the most attention from investors. Letting R it be the sovereign rating, we have the following model
where In this situation, random effects will be preferable on efficiency grounds since fixed effects makes inefficient use of the data 8 and OLS fails to account for the correlation which is created by the panel structure of the data. The c i will capture any unobserved or unmeasurable country-specific effects such as cultural or historical factors. These factors may be related to observable macro-economic variables (as is found in the economic growth literature, see Barro (1997) , for example). Under the assumption that c i are correlated with any of the included variables in x it or z i , only fixed effects will provide unbiased estimation. OLS, random effects, and random effects ordered probit will all be inconsistent under this assumption as none of these techniques remove c i from the model. 9 Our a priori belief is that the unobserved country effects are correlated with the other explanatory variables and theoretically, therefore, we think that the fixed effects results should be the most reliable.
The second important methodological issue is the treatment of R it . Many papers treat the ratings as being on a linear scale (see column 6 of table 1). This incorporates the perhaps undesirable assumption that the distance between a rating of AAA and AA+ is the same as the distance between a rating of BBB-and BB+. Any one step change in ratings is equivalent to any other one step change under this assumption. As R it can be thought of as representing the probability of default, this variable should really be viewed as providing information about this underlying latent (unobserved)
probability. An ordered probit specification, using random effects to account for the correlation induced by the panel structure, provides less restrictive assumptions about the relationship between the R it and the probability of default. See the recent papers by Bissoondoyal-Bheenick et al. (2005) and Afonso et al. (2006a) which discuss this issue in the context of the determinants of sovereign ratings.
An alternative option to deal with possible non-linearity in R it is to adopt an ad hoc transformation of the linear scale. We explored ad hoc transformations of the linear rating scale (such as the paper by Afonso et al. (2006b) ) using a logistic transformation but we found that it did not make much difference for our results.
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Results
The main question of interest is whether ratings agencies are over-rating oil-producing countries in the recent period of sharp increases in oil and gas prices even after controlling for the improvement in fundamentals in oil-producing countries. We find strong evidence in the latter part of the sample period of a ratings premium for high oilproducing countries. This finding is robust to a wide range of econometric models, to the variables which are included in the study, and to the use of forecast information in addition to currently available information. Tables 4 and 5 Tables 4 and 6 present our estimates of the four models discussed in section 3 with the inclusion of a full set of control variables for the Standard and Poor's and Moody's data, respectively. As described above, we interact time dummies with dummy variables for low and high oil-producing countries. Looking at the interaction terms between time and high oil-producing, we find that these coefficients are significant from 2003 onwards for Standard and Poor's and from 2005 onwards for Moody's. The size of the coefficients (and their statistical significance) is increasing over the latter half of the sample period in both cases. This result, which is the main one of our paper, is consistent across all four econometric specifications of our model and is robust to inclusion/exclusion of any of the other independent variables. We discuss the interpretation of these results in detail in section 4.1.
Fixed effects is the only method which controls for correlation between unobserved country effects and included explanatory variables. We can test this assumption using the Hausman (1978) test. This test, conditional on the model being specified correctly 10 These are available from the authors.
in other ways, compares the fixed effects and random effects coefficients and can be used as a test of correlation between unobserved time-invariant omitted variables and included exogenous variables. For the Standard and Poor's data, we find a test statistic of 70.4 and for the Moody's data, a test statistic of 73.3. In both cases the p-value of the test is less than .001 and we thus reject the null hypothesis that unobserved country effects are uncorrelated with the included explanatory variables. The implication is that the assumptions which underpin OLS, linear random effects, and random effects ordered probit are invalid. On the basis of this test, and in line with our a priori assumptions as outlined above, we prefer the fixed effects specification. In the discussion that follows, we will thus focus on the fixed effects models.
For the Standard and Poor's data, we find that the year dummies are jointly insignificant. We find that the interaction terms between low oil-producing countries onwards but the coefficients on low-oil producing countries are jointly insignificant.
The p-values for these two tests are at the bottom of tables 4 and 6. In Tables 5 and   7 , we present reduced models where we impose the restrictions from these two sets of tests. For OLS and random effects models applied to the Standard and Poor's data, we eliminate both the year dummies and the interactions between year and low-oil producing country dummies. For fixed effects and the random effects ordered probit, we eliminate only the year dummies. The results, in terms of the coefficients on highoil producing countries and other economic variables, are substantively the same. For the Moody's sample (Table 7) , we eliminate the coefficients on the dummy variables for low-oil producing countries for all 4 models. Again, the main results do not change.
The other included explanatory variables in the models mostly have the expected signs. Advanced countries are rated higher on average while Latin and Central American countries and those with a previous history of default are rated lower on average after controlling for other variables. These results are consistent across all models and both data sets. GDP level and growth have significant positive effects, for the most part. They are insignificant in some of the models. Inflation, where significant, has a negative effect. Government debt has a negative effect, as does the ratio of external debt to current account receipts. The coefficients on trade as a percentage of GDP are generally negative, which may reflect small country exposure to international currency and market fluctuations. As many of the right-hand side variables are highly correlated, caution should be exercised in interpreting the individual coefficients. (e.g., This
should not be interpreted as saying that trade is bad. Higher trade might be strongly correlated with higher GDP and the combination of the two may have a positive effect on ratings.)
Ours is the first study, to our knowledge, to include regulatory quality as an explanatory variable. We find that regulatory quality has a strong, positive effect on the sovereign rating as one might expect. We would encourage people to include this variable in future studies.
Oil producing countries and sovereign ratings
How should we interpret the positive and significant coefficients on high-oil producing countries in the second part of the sample period? One interpretation is that Standard (2006)) that they take into account forecast information in determining the ratings.
Perhaps the significant and positive coefficients for high oil-producing countries reflect forecasts of crude oil price increases and forecasted improvements in fundamentals which the rating agencies expect in these countries.
The first thing we can do is to consider whether the coefficients on high-oil producing countries appear to lead increases in crude oil prices or whether they are contemporaneously correlated with crude oil prices. Tables 9 and 10 present the correlations between our estimated coefficients and oil price changes and levels for our sample period and for the post-2000 period. These correlations give us some information, but it is important to recognize that they are based on only nine coefficients which are themselves estimates. Standard errors for these correlation coefficients are very large.
In Table 9 , we find only small correlations between oil price changes and our co-
efficients. There appears to be more contemporaneous correlation if we consider the post-2001 period only. If coefficients reflect forecasts of future oil price then there should be a strong correlation between past coefficients and current price changes but this is not the case. The correlation decreases for Standard and Poor's and is actually negative for Moody's.
In Table 10 , we repeat the same exercise but for levels of oil price instead of changes. Correlations with levels are much higher than with changes. For Moody's, we find that contemporaneous correlations are higher than the correlation between the current coefficients and future prices. For Standard and Poor's we find high correlations with both current and future prices.
One would not want to draw strong inference from these results, but we can at least conclude that the relationship between the ratings premium to high oil-producing countries is related more to price levels than to changes. Furthermore the correlations between current prices and current ratings are at least as strong as those between current ratings and future prices. Neither of these would suggest that the ratings premium to high oil producing countries is driven more by expected improvements in oil prices than by current prices. Given that both our estimated coefficients and prices are increasing during most of the sample, it is difficult to sort out these two effects.
Next, we look at whether these results reflect forecasts of the ratings agencies themselves. Our ability to do this is quite limited by data. We found that all of the forecast variables were insignificant except government debt. Forecasts of government debt were significantly negative as expected. More surprisingly, we found that when we included the forecast variables in the regression of Lastly, we note that for the Standard and Poor's data we find a positive coefficient on the low-oil producing countries for every year, although the coefficient for 2001 is not significant. This could be interpreted as evidence that low-oil producing countries are also receiving a premium during this period. However, the coefficients seem unrelated to the price of oil. The coefficient in 2002, for example, when oil prices increased by a modest 3 per cent, appears larger (although the difference is not statistically 11 This result is in the fixed effects model. The coefficient increases by a similar magnitude in the other models as well. Results available from the authors upon request. We have included this in the appendix of the submitted version but would propose that it be dropped from the final paper. significant) than the coefficient in 2005, when crude oil increased by 44 per cent. In fact, we can not reject the equality of the coefficients on low-oil producing countries across all eight years of our sample (p-value of the test is 0.43). We thus interpret this result as capturing something about the fixed effect for the low-oil producing set of countries shown in the top panel of Table 3 .
Robustness and predictive accuracy
In addition to the Hausman test described just above, we conducted a wide variety of specification tests and robustness checks which we outline in this section. All of the results discussed here are available from the authors upon request.
If we re-estimate any of the models eliminating all those variables which are insignificant for that model, our results are unaffected. The size of the coefficients on high-oil producing countries generally increases, but for the most part the changes are not significant.
One might worry that the results are driven by one particular country behaving as an influential observation. To check this, we subjected each model to a data exclusion test by sequentially dropping each high oil producing country one at a time and rechecking the estimates. For example, we drop Qatar from the sample, re-estimate all four models and check the estimates. We then replace Qatar back into the sample and drop Bahrain, re-estimating all four models and again checking the estimates, etc.
While the coefficient of high oil production countries varies a bit across the test, in all exclusion cases, the estimate of the coefficients on high oil-production remained The results remain significant if we replace the standard error estimates with estimates calculated from a robust variance-covariance matrix formed using the standard outer-product formula (see Wooldridge (2002) ). As Wooldridge (2002) points out, some caution needs to be exercised in using this robust standard error correction in panel data models, however when the cross-sectional sample size (n) is large relative to the number of time periods (T ) (in our case n ≥ 100 and T = 9) this gives consistent (in n) estimates. All coefficients in 2005 onwards remain significant at the 5 per cent level (or smaller) when we use the robust standard errors.
If we re-estimate the model on smaller samples and predict forward one year, the model performs very well. Using 1999 Using -2004 Using , 1999 Using -2005 Using , and 1999 Using -2006 Using , we predicted 2005 Using , 2006 Using , and 2007 , and one hundred percent of the predicted ratings lie within two notches of the truth. The fixed effects and random effects models correctly predict 64 and 68 per cent of the ratings for the Standard and Poor's and Moody's data, respectively. 97 and 99 per cent are within one notch of the predicted rating. The predictive accuracy of the model is strong.
Discussion and Conclusion
We find strong statistical evidence that Standard and Poor's and Moody's are giving a premium in their sovereign ratings to countries for whom net oil and gas revenues account for more than 20 per cent of gross domestic product. This premium coincides The ratings premium to high oil producing countries is very large. Using our preferred results for Standard and Poor's ratings, a country would need to increase its economic growth by three and a half percentage points per year to get an equally large boost in their sovereign rating. Based upon the results for Moody's, a country would need to increase its economic growth by two and a half percentage points per year.
One hypothesis is that the ratings agencies premium to high oil producing countries reflects expected improvements in fundamentals or future increases in oil prices for which we are unable to control. We find no evidence for the former hypothesis. In fact, including forecast's (for Moody's only) for the 2007 ratings causes the premium to high oil producing countries to increase. This is exactly the opposite of what we would expect if our results are in fact driven by expected improvements in economic fundamentals.
Perhaps sovereign ratings agencies have incorporated forecasts of future oil prices into their models? This may well be the case, but we are sceptical about their ability to do so accurately. First, in the post-2000 period, we find higher correlations between current premiums to high oil-producing countries and current oil prices than we do between current premiums and future changes in oil prices. For Moody's, the correlation between current premiums and future price changes is negative. This evidence is based on few observations, however, and may perhaps be discounted.
More importantly, resource prices in general, and oil prices in particular, are extremely difficult to forecast. In early 1999, The Economist (1999a) magazine, along with many finance and business observers, forecast declining oil prices on the basis of several years of very low oil prices. Exactly the opposite happened and The Economist (1999b) published their mea culpa nine months later.
Our conclusion, thus, is that to the degree to which high oil producing countries are receiving a premium in sovereign ratings on the basis of current (and future expected) high oil prices, these countries are particularly exposed to unexpected drops in oil prices. After five years of steadily increasing oil prices, observers seem only able to imagine high and ever increasing prices. Such expectations have often been disappointed in the past and, in the event of an unexpected drop in oil prices, high oil producing countries sovereign ratings can be expected to suffer. The subsequent downgrades will be more severe than that warranted by the deterioration in economic fundamentals if ratings agencies simultaneously withdraw the premium which they appear to be assigning to these countries. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. * * * significant at 1% level; * * significant at 5% level; * significant at 10% level The constant in the fixed effects regression is the average of the country-specific effects. For the ordered probit model, we do not report the estimates of the cut-off points. They are available from the authors. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. * * * significant at 1% level; * * significant at 5% level; * significant at 10% level Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. * * * significant at 1% level; * * significant at 5% level; * significant at 10% level The constant in the fixed effects regression is the average of the country-specific effects. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. * * * significant at 1% level; * * significant at 5% level; * significant at 10% level The constant in the fixed effects regression is the average of the country-specific effects. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. * * * significant at 1% level; * * significant at 5% level; * significant at 10% level The constant in the fixed effects regression is the average of the country-specific effects. 
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